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The Impact of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 133
on the Banking Industry*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 16, 1998, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)' issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)
133.2 This long awaited statement contains major changes to the
accounting rules for trillions of dollars worth of derivative
transactions.3 The accounting requirements contained in this standard
will have a tremendous effect on the banking industry because
financial institutions are generally the largest users and providers of
derivatives 4 and because of the unique accounting problems that result
from managing the various risks inherent in the banking business.
This note examines the impact this standard will have on financial
institutions and analyzes the legislation that it has prompted. Part II of
this note contains a brief explanation of derivatives and their use by
financial institutions. Part III outlines the basic accounting rules
contained in SFAS 133. Part IV analyzes the impact these rules may
have on financial institutions and addresses some of the concerns that
the banking industry has over this standard. The final section details
the legislative responses to the issuance of SFAS 133 and analyzes
whether these measures are appropriate. The conclusions of this
* The author of this note, Mark Henry, is a second year law student at The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law. He is also a Certified Public Accountant
and Certified Managerial Accountant, and gained the experience necessary for these
certifications by working primarily on capital markets audits for a big six public
accounting firm.
1. The FASB is an entirely private-sector accounting body that was established in
1973 based on a proposal by the Wheat committee. As such, the FASB has no inherent
authority, but rather derives its power from the SEC's recognition of its standards as
generally accepted accounting principles for purposes of financial disclosure. See Martin
Mayer, FASB on Trial, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1997, at 79, 81.
2. See Steve Burkholder, FASB Issues Derivatives Standard As Lawmakers Try to
Curb Its Authority, 70 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1006 (June 22, 1998).
3. See id.
4. See Derivatives Disclosure and Accounting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 400 (1997)
[hereinafter Derivatives Hearings] (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
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analysis are twofold. The first is that SFAS 133 represents a
significant improvement over the current accounting rules for
derivatives even though in some ways it may negatively impact
financial institutions. The second is that the legislation proposed in
response to the issuance of this standard does not appropriately address
the banking industry's specific criticisms of SFAS 133 or its general
criticisms of the process for setting accounting standards and therefore
should not be adopted.
II. OVERVIEW OF DERIVATIVES
Part of the mystery surrounding derivatives is that there is not
one simple definition that explains exactly what a derivative financial
instrument is.5  For example, the accounting firm KPMG Peat
Marwick LLP defines a derivative as, "[a] generic term often used to
categorize a wide variety of financial instruments whose value
'depends on' or is 'derived from' the value of an underlying asset,
reference rate or index." 6  Although this definition identifies what
makes a financial instrument a derivative, namely that its value is
based on the value of something else, it does little to facilitate a truly
functional understanding of what derivatives are and how they
operate. 7 Unfortunately, the definition contained in SFAS 133' is even
less helpful in explaining the practicalities of derivatives to a reader
who has little or no previous exposure to them.
Briefly defining and analyzing the specific derivatives most
commonly used by financial institutions may facilitate a general
5. See generally KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF
DERIVATIVES (1994).
6. Id. at 1.
7. See id.
8. SFAS 133 defines a derivative as a financial instrument or other contract with all
three of the following characteristics: a. It has (1) one or more underlyings and (2) one or
more notional amounts or payment provisions or both. Those terms determine the amount
of the settlement or settlements, and, in some cases, whether or not a settlement is
required. b. It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller
than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a
similar response to changes in market factors. c. Its terms require or permit net
settlement, it can readily be settled net by a means outside the contract, or it provides for
delivery of an asset that puts the recipient in a position not substantially different from net
settlement. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 133 ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND
HEDGING ACTIVITIES 3 (June 1998) [hereinafter SFAS 1331.
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understanding of the concept of derivatives better than attempting to
broadly define them. These instruments may be broken down into
three general categories: forward-based contracts, options, and interest
rate swaps.9
A. Forward-Based Contracts
A forward-based contract is an agreement to buy or sell a
financial instrument or commodity on a specified date at an agreed
price.'" These contracts may be further broken down into two groups:
forwards and futures." In terms of the substantive agreement, a future
is very similar to a forward. 2 The main differences between the two
are: (1) futures have standard dates for either net settlement or
delivery of the underlying asset whereas settlement dates for forwards
are privately negotiated, (2) futures are traded in standardized units
whereas forwards may be written for any amount, and (3) futures are
traded on an organized exchange whereas forwards are over-the-
counter products. 13  The exchange coordinates the processing and
settlement of futures and requires each party to post an initial margin
deposit of cash or securities. 14 Additional variation margin is posted
on a daily basis in an amount equal to the difference between the
initial contract price and the daily closing price of the contract in order
to limit the counterparty credit risk of futures.' 5 A currency future is
an example of a typical future. 16 This contract requires delivery of a
specified quantity of a foreign currency on a future date at a fixed
exchange rate.17 The value of the currency future then changes on a
daily basis as foreign exchange rates fluctuate. 8
9. See generally KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5.
10. See id. at 2. See generally DAVID WINSTONE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (1995).
11. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 2.
12. See id. at 3.
13. See THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. AND RISK MAGAZINE, THE CHASE
GUIDE TO RISK MANAGEMENT 31 (1993).
14. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 3.
15. See id.
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B. Options
The second general category of derivative financial instruments
is options. An option is a contract that gives the holder the right, but
not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying" at a fixed price (the
strike price) on or before a specified date (the exercise period).20 An
option that provides the buyer the right to buy an underlying is known
as a call and allows the holder to benefit when the price of the
underlying rises above the strike price. 2 Similarly, an option that
provides the buyer the right to sell an underlying is known as a put
and allows the holder to benefit when the price of the underlying falls
below the strike price.22 In exchange for the right to exercise the
option, the holder pays a premium to the party who sells (writes) the
option. 23 The writer of the option then has the obligation to buy or
sell the underlying at the strike price if the option is exercised. 4 The
most common example of an option is a stock option, which gives the
holder the right to buy or sell a fixed number of shares of stock at the
specified strike price on or before a fixed date in the future. 25
C. Interest Rate Swaps
The final general category of derivatives commonly used by
financial institutions consists of interest rate swaps. An interest rate
swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange interest rate
payments that are based on a specified notional amount for a given
period of time.26 Normally the interest rate payments over the life of
the swap are equal in value when the parties initially enter into the
19. An underlying is the variable or instrument on which the option contract is based.
Examples of underlyings include, but are not limited to, equity securities, indexes and
commodities. See THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. AND RISK MAGAZINE, supra note
13, at 54.
20. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 6. See generally NARU
PAREKH, DERIVATIVES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (1995); WINSTONE, supra note 10.
21. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 6.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. AND RISK MAGAZINE, supra note 13, at
41.
25. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 7.
26. See id. at 4. See generally PAREKH, supra note 20; WINSTONE, supra note 10.
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21agreement. The parties settle the net obligation under the agreement
on a periodic basis as specified in the contract.28 There are several
types of interest rate swaps that are routinely utilized by financial
institutions. The most common is a plain vanilla swap, where one
party agrees to pay a fixed rate of interest on a fixed notional amount
to the other counterparty in exchange for a variable rate of interest on
the same notional amount.29 The most common variable rate used for
plain vanilla swaps is the London Inter Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR)
because it is a truly international market rate. 30 However, other rates
such as the prime rate or the rate on U.S. treasury obligations may be
used.3' A basis swap is a contract where the parties agree to exchange
interest payments based on two different variable rates.32  For
example, one party may agree to make payments based on LIBOR in
exchange for payments based on the rate on 30 year U.S. treasury
bonds. Finally, an index-amortizing swap is essentially a plain vanilla
swap with an embedded option.33
D. Use of Derivatives
In order to understand fully the impact SFAS 133 will have on
the use of and accounting for derivatives, it is helpful to examine how
derivatives are frequently used. There are three main uses of
derivatives today: speculation and arbitrage, reduction of funding
costs, and risk management. For the most part, only dealers and
27. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 4. For example, assume that a
party wants to pay a fixed rate of interest on a given notional and receive a variable rate
based on LIBOR for one year. If the current market rate for a fixed rate obligation of
parties with similar credit risks is 8% and LIBOR is currently 6%, the party may agree to






32. See id. at 5.
33. See THE CHASE MANHATrAN BANK, N.A. AND RISK MAGAZINE, supra note 13, at
36. The embedded option portion of an index amortizing swap is the feature whereby the
notional amount of the swap amortizes based on changes in interest rates. See id. For
example, the notional may amortize as interest rates fall, thus the fixed-rate receiver has
essentially granted an option to the fixed-rate payer because the fixed-rate payer has the
"option" to make and receive interest payments based on a lower notional when interest
rates fall. See id.
1999] 295
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traders use derivatives for speculation or arbitrage, however financial
institutions may choose to use derivatives to speculate on the direction
of various markets.34 When an institution uses derivatives for
speculation, it is normally attempting to predict which way interest
rates, commodity prices, equity prices or foreign exchange rates will
move. 35  On the other hand, arbitrage involves using derivatives to
take two offsetting positions in order to take advantage of inefficient
pricing in the market.36
Derivatives are also often used to reduce funding costs. 37  It
has been estimated that over half of all new financings utilize
derivatives.38 The most common use for derivative financial
instruments in structured financings involves a borrower issuing either
fixed or floating rate debt and then simultaneously entering into an
interest rate swap.39 In this manner, a company can convert its fixed
rate debt into a variable rate obligation, or convert a variable rate
obligation into a fixed rate obligation. 40  By utilizing derivatives in
these transactions, it is possible to take advantage of differences in
interest rates for different borrowers, usually due to differences in
credit risk, and/or possible cross border tax differences that could not
be achieved by just directly issuing debt. 41
Finally, the most common use for derivatives is to manage
(hedge) risk.42 Financial institutions may use derivatives to manage
several different types of risk. First, derivatives, usually options, may
be used to protect against securities price risk.43 Derivatives may also
34. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP, supra note 5, at 19.
35. See id.
36. See id. For example, if gold futures for delivery in one month are selling for $300
per ounce in New York and $301 in London, a trader may take a long position on New
York futures and an offsetting short position in London futures in order to take advantage
of the $1 spread.





42. See id. at 13.
43. See id. at 14. For example, if X purchases 100 shares of Y Company for $150
per share, X can limit his possible loss on the stock by purchasing a put option which
allows him to sell his 100 shares at some fixed strike price (e.g., $125 per share). In this
example, X's possible loss is limited to $25 per share plus the premium paid for the option
because if the market price for Y Company shares falls below $125, X will exercise his
option and sell his 100 shares for $125 per share.
[Vol. 3296
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be used to manage interest rate risk or to reduce a firm's exposure to
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates or changes in the prices of
commodities.4" Financial institutions also use derivatives to manage
risks other than market risk, such as credit, operational, and/or
liquidity risk.
a6
IH. ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVES UNDER SFAS 133
Although SFAS 133 is a rather long and detailed statement -
FASB Chairman Edmund Jenkins called it "250 pages of scintillating
reading"'4 7 - most of the basic concepts are fairly straightforward.
The actual accounting for derivatives under SFAS 133 can be broken
down into two general parts: initial recognition of derivatives and
subsequent changes in fair value. For initial recognition, SFAS 133
requires all derivatives to be recognized as either assets or liabilities
on the balance sheet.4' Recognition as an asset or liability will depend
on the rights or obligations under the specific contracts.49 The value
to be recognized on the balance sheet is the fair value of the financial
instrument as determined by using the guidance provided in SFAS
107, "Disclosures About Fair Value of Financial Instruments." s°
Recognition of all derivatives on the balance sheet at fair value
represents a significant change from current accounting practices,
which do not require certain derivatives such as interest rate swaps to
be recognized on the balance sheet at all.
51
The accounting for subsequent changes in the fair values of
derivatives recorded on the balance sheet will depend on the use of
each financial instrument. First, an entity must determine if the
44. Examples include modifying the maturities of interest-bearing assets or liabilities,
such as when a firm uses T-bill futures to shorten the maturity of its current T-bill
holdings, and hedging anticipated transactions, such as when a mortgage company uses
forwards to reduce the interest rate risk associated with its commitment to fund mortgage
loans in the future. See id. at 15.
45. See id. at 15-16.
46. See id. at 14.
47. Burkholder, supra note 2, at 1006.
48. See SFAS 133, supra note 8, at 9.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See Troy J. Butner & Richard L. Brezovec, The Implications of the FASB's
Hedging Project for Financial Institutions, 11 BANK Acer. & FIN. 49 (Winter 1998),
available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, CURNWS File.
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derivative will be designated as a hedging instrument. 12 If a derivative
is not designated as a hedging instrument, then the change in fair value
will be recognized in earnings as a gain or loss in the period when the
change in value occurred.53 Financial institutions will use this method
for derivatives that are used for speculation and/or arbitrage.
If the derivative is designated as a hedging instrument, there
are three ways to account for a change in fair value depending on the
specific classification of the hedge. 54 First, a derivative used as a
hedging instrument may be classified as a fair value hedge.55 In a fair
value hedge, a derivative financial instrument is used to reduce
exposure to changes in the fair value of either a recognized asset or
liability.5 6  Subsequent changes in fair value of these hedges are
recognized as gains or losses in earnings in the period the market
value changed. 7 The offsetting gains or losses on the recognized asset
or liability being hedged are also recognized in earnings in this
period.58 The effect of this treatment is to recognize in earnings the
net gain or loss resulting from the ineffectiveness of the hedge in
offsetting changes in fair value of the hedged item. 59
The second hedge classification is a cash flow hedge. 60 For a
derivative to be designated a cash flow hedge, it must be hedging a
firm's exposure to variable cash flows from a forecasted transaction. 6'
Subsequent changes in fair value resulting from the effective portion of
the hedge are initially recognized in other comprehensive income.62
Other comprehensive income is not a component of earnings, so the
gains or losses resulting from changes in fair value of these
instruments will initially only impact equity. 63 However, these gains
or losses are subsequently reclassed into earnings in the period when
52. See SFAS 133, supra note 8, at 9.
53. See id. at 10.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 11.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Michael G. Stevens, Derivatives Rules Finally a Reality, PRAc. ACCT., Aug.
1998, at 33, 33.
60. See SFAS 133, supra note 8, at 10.
61. See id. at 18.
62. See id. at 10.
63. See Stevens, supra note 59, at 33.
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the forecasted transaction being hedged affects earnings.' 4 Gains or
losses from any portion of the hedge deemed ineffective are reported
in earnings immediately.65
The final classification is a foreign currency hedge of a net
investment in a foreign operation.66 If a derivative financial
instrument is hedging this type of exposure, then any gain or loss
resulting from a change in the fair value of the derivative is recognized
as a component of other comprehensive income as part of the
cumulative foreign currency translation adjustment. 67
The requirements for the initial adoption of SFAS 133 are
fairly straightforward as well. SFAS 133 is effective for all quarters
of all fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999, though it may be
adopted early as of the beginning of any fiscal quarter after issuance of
the Standard.68  Upon adoption of the Standard, all hedging
relationships should be designated and appropriately documented. 69
SFAS 133 also requires companies to define the parameters of a
"highly effective" hedging strategy in order for derivatives designated
as hedges to qualify for hedge accounting. 70 Thereafter, firms must
assess the effectiveness of their hedging strategies on at least a
quarterly basis. 7' Any derivative financial instruments initially
designated as hedges that subsequently fall outside these parameters
will no longer qualify for hedge accounting, meaning that changes in
fair value will have to be recognized in earnings in the period of
change.72 Although the FASB has not provided official guidance on
how to measure the effectiveness of a hedging strategy, it has
indicated that the SEC would consider items to be "highly correlated"
if the change in value of the hedge is within plus or minus 20 % of the
offsetting change in value of the hedged item. 7s In adopting a highly
64. See SFAS 133, supra note 8, at 10.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 11.
68. See id. at 29.
69. See id. at 10.
70. See id. at 11.
71. See id. at 12.
72. See id. at 16.
73. See Mel Strauss, Examining FAS 133: Managing the Balance Sheet, U.S.
BANKER, Sept. 1998, at 68, 70.
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effective hedge strategy, it is also permissible to hedge against a group
of assets that are fairly consistent or homogeneous. 74
IV. IMPACT OF SFAS 133 ON THE BANKING INDUSTRY
SFAS 133 will likely have the greatest impact on the banking
industry as it generally includes the largest users and providers of
derivatives 75 and because of the unique accounting problems that result
from managing the various risks inherent in the banking business.7 6
Furthermore, based on the extensive lobbying efforts in Congress, it
appears that the banking industry is adamantly opposed to the
implementation of SFAS 133. 77 The dissatisfaction with the new
accounting standard seems to revolve around four main objections: (1)
the use of fair value on the balance sheet, (2) the probable increase in
volatility in the financial statements, (3) the significant costs of
implementation, and (4) the suspected decline of prudent risk
management.
A. Use of Fair Value
The first main objection that the banking industry has to SFAS
133 is the general requirement that derivatives be recorded at fair
value on the balance sheet.7" This requirement is really the foundation
of the entire standard, because if derivatives are not recorded at fair
value, then the issues arising from the accounting for subsequent
changes in fair value are irrelevant. While the banking industry
74. See SFAS 133, supra note 8, at 13.
75. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 400 (prepared statement of William J.
Roberts).
76. This note focuses on the impact that SFAS 133 will have on financial reporting for
the banking industry. However, SFAS 133 will also impact regulatory reporting, the
computation of net capital requirements, and other regulatory requirements of financial
institutions. See generally Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection;
Comment Request, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,470 (proposed Dec. 28, 1998); Proposed Agency
Information Collection Activities; Comment Request, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,794 (proposed Oct.
1, 1998); Interim Regulatory Reporting and Capital Guidance on FAS 133, "Accounting
for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities" Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 62-
159 (Dec. 29, 1998).
77. See Butner & Brezovec, supra note 51.




admits that the use of fair values may be appropriate in some
situations, it opposes fair value accounting for derivatives because
financial institutions are not managed using fair values.79 Instead,
management evaluates the net cash flows resulting from the derivative
and the item being hedged over the life of the transaction."0
Therefore, providing fair value information to users of financial
statements does not provide them with information that accurately
reflects the underlying circumstances of the business, nor does it
provide a useful comparison of business trends. 8
Several other arguments exist against using fair values on the
balance sheet. First, the use of a "hybrid" value82 for the assets and
liabilities being hedged is problematic because there is no objective
way to compute the values, and thus the comparability of financial
statements between firms will be reduced. 3 This comparability
problem will be exacerbated by the fact that values of instruments for
which there is no ready market will be heavily laden with assumptions
that are likely to vary from one firm to the next. 4 Finally, there is
great concern that SFAS 133 is a piecemeal approach to the use of fair
values.8 5 The FASB has recently begun a study of the use of fair
values for all financial instruments, and the banking industry believes
that SFAS 133 should be delayed until the results of this study are
complete.86 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued
that "fair value accounting for all financial instruments could
inappropriately increase the reported volatility of earnings and equity
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Financial Accounting Standards Board's Rule: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Sec. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises of the Comm. on Banking and
Fin. Services, 105th Cong. 288 (1997) [hereinafter FASB Hearing] (prepared statement by
Susan M. Philips).
82. The "hybrid" value is the result of the asset or liability being adjusted for changes
in fair value related to the risk being hedged. For example, if an interest rate swap is
used to hedge the interest rate risk associated with a variable rate loan, the loan will be
reported on the balance sheet at cost (generally the amount funded) as adjusted for the
change in fair value of the loan due just to changes in interest rates. Thus, changes in the
fair value of the loan due to other factors, such as a change in credit risk, would not affect
the value on the balance sheet. See id. (prepared statement by Susan M. Philips).
83. See id. at 289 (prepared statement by Susan M. Philips).
84. See id. at 329 (prepared statement of David S. Berry).
85. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 401 (prepared statement of William J.
Roberts).
86. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
1999]
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measurements" and "reduce the reliability of financial statement
values" if conservative and fairly specific standards for estimation of
the fair values of financial instruments are not adopted.87 These
repercussions could put banks at a serious disadvantage in the capital
markets as almost all of their assets and liabilities would be recorded
at fair value while few of non-financial institutions' assets and
liabilities would be recorded at fair value.88 The result may be an
increase in the relative investor uncertainty regarding the financial
position of banks.89
B. Increased Volatility
The second general objection of the banking industry centers
on a suspected increase in volatility of the reported earnings and equity
of financial institutions resulting from the accounting for subsequent
changes in fair value of the derivatives. Three basic examples help
illustrate their position. The first example involves the use of
forwards to hedge the mortgage-banking pipeline. 90 When a mortgage
bank commits to fund a loan at a fixed interest rate, it exposes itself to
interest rate risk during the time period between this commitment and
the sale of the loan. 91 In order to hedge this expected transaction (the
sale of the loan), mortgage bankers use forwards. 92 Under SFAS 133,
a forward used to hedge this exposure may be designated as a cash
flow hedge of a forecasted transaction. 93 Thus, the changes in fair
value of the forward will be reported in equity, with no offset for
changes in value of the commitment to fund the loan. 94  This is
because the commitment is still a forecasted transaction and thus has
not been recorded in the financial statements. 95 Thus, the accounting
for these hedging transactions under SFAS 133 will increase volatility
87. Id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
88. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
89. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).







in the equity of mortgage banks.
96
The second example of a transaction that results in increased
volatility is any hedge transaction that is ineffective. 97 Under SFAS
133, changes in the fair value of derivatives that are not perfectly
offset by changes in fair value of the item being hedged are reported in
earnings. For example, if the fair value of a mortgage bank's
commitment to fund a loan increases by $100 and the value of a
forward used to hedge this commitment decreases by $110, the firm
must report a loss of $10 in earnings in the current period. Under
current practice, however, the firm would not report any loss in
earnings as long as correlation between the two was established. 99
Thus, the accounting treatment required under SFAS 133 would
increase volatility in earnings.
100
The final example, which is the use of derivatives in a macro
hedging strategy, also results in volatility in earnings. 'o' SFAS 133
does not permit the use of hedge accounting for hedges of diverse
groups of assets or liabilities, such as the net interest rate risk position
of both loans and deposits of a bank.1 2 Thus, the changes in fair
values of derivatives used in a macro hedging strategy must be
reported in earnings in the period of change, with no offset from the
change in values of the hedged items as these items are generally
recorded at historical cost, and not fair value, on the balance sheet.
This result is particularly problematic, given that the Federal Reserve
increasingly is encouraging banks to use macro hedging strategies to
manage the aggregate risks of banking while de-emphasizing the use of




99. See id. Correlation was generally established as long as the change in fair value
of the derivative was within plus or minus 20% of the change in fair value of the item
being hedged.
100. See id.
101. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 402-403 (prepared statement of
William J. Roberts).
102. See id. at 402 (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
103. See FASB Hearing, supra note 81, at 285 (prepared statement by Susan M.
Phillips).
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C. Costs of Implementation
Financial institutions have also argued that the implementation
of SFAS 133 will have significant costs, and that these costs are not
justified based on the relatively few benefits to users of financial
statements. The largest costs associated with implementation will be
systems related.'o4 Since most banks do not manage derivatives based
on fair values, they do not currently have systems capable of
generating the accounting entries associated with SFAS 133. 'os The
emphasis placed by SFAS 133 on hedging specific transactions rather
than entire portfolios will compound the cost of implementation
because new risk management systems will also be needed since the
current systems are designed for macro hedging.' 6 Additional
systems complications that will increase the cost of implementation
include the need to simultaneously address Year 2000 computer
problems, a lack of knowledgeable programmers and the lack of
software that has addressed the new standard.
10 7
The other significant costs associated with implementation of
SFAS 133 relate to accounting measurement challenges. 0 8  The
measurement of fair value for derivative financial instruments will
require significant effort for many financial institutions, especially for
financial instruments for which there is no ready market. 109 For these
instruments, the fair value will have to be estimated using a discounted
cash flow analysis, and may include management assumptions that are
difficult to automate." 0 An even more sophisticated pricing model
will be required to estimate the "hybrid" value for hedged items as
this value represents the historical cost as adjusted for changes in fair
value due solely to the risk being hedged."' Finally, the quarterly
104. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 399-400 (prepared statement of
William J. Roberts).
105. See id. at 400 (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
106. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
107. See FASB Hearing, supra note 81, at 321 (prepared statement of Susan Schmidt
Bies). See also David S. Greaves, Banks and the Year 2000 Problem, 2 N.C. BANKING
INST. 390 (1998) (discussing possible effects of the year 2000 problem on the banking
industry).






evaluation of the effectiveness of every hedge transaction will require
significant new resources. 1
12
D. Decline of Risk Management
The final, and most significant, objection of the banking
industry to the adoption of SFAS 133 is that it may discourage the use
of prudent risk management. The basic premise of this argument is
that if a risk management strategy does not qualify for hedge
accounting under the standard, then financial institutions will be much
less likely to utilize it because of the aforementioned volatility
concerns. 113 For example, deposits with no contractual maturity and
securities designated by management as held-to-maturity may not be
designated as hedged items under SFAS 133." M Thus, if management
chooses to use derivatives to hedge these items, the change in fair
value of the derivative must be reported in earnings in the current
period with no offset for the corresponding change in fair value of the
deposits or securities as these instruments are recorded at historical
cost. Since this will increase the volatility of earnings, management
may choose not to follow a prudent risk management strategy by
leaving the interest rate risk associated with these instruments
unhedged.
The adoption of SFAS 133 might also result in financial
institutions decreasing their use of certain derivatives." 5 For example,
the use of basis swaps may decline, as SFAS 133 requires that both
sides of the swap be designated against some asset or liability in order
to qualify for hedge accounting. 116  Similarly, the use of index
amortizing swaps may decline as uncertainty over the embedded
option feature of the swap and whether it will qualify for hedge
112. See id.
113. See generally id.
114. Seeid.
115. See Certain Derivatives to Lose Luster, CFO ALERT, July 13, 1998, available in
LEXIS, Bankng Library, CURNWS File.
116. See id. This means that rate index of one leg of the swap (for example LIBOR)
will have to match the rate index of the asset being hedged and the rate index of the other
leg (for example the 30-year U.S. Treasury Bond rate) match the rate index of the liability
being hedged. See Katherine M. Reynolds, Regulation: FASB Tweaks its New Rule, But
Declines Fed Suggestions, BOND BUYER, Nov. 17, 1997, at 34, available in LEXIS,
Bankng Library, CURNWS File.
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accounting will make financial institutions wary of these derivatives. 7
In order to avoid the volatility associated with the use of
derivatives, financial institutions may be forced to use cash
instruments, which are not subject to SFAS 133, to hedge the risks
inherent in the banking industry. 8 This would result in increased cost
because cash instruments cannot be tailored to offset the particular
risks of a specific portfolio of financial instruments, and therefore are
often more expensive to use." 9  Furthermore, cash instruments
introduce more credit risk because they are more capital intensive. 2 °
The increased cost of these hedging transactions will most likely be
passed on to the public in the form of lower rates on deposits or higher
rates on loans. '
2
The costs associated with implementation of SFAS 133 may
also affect the risk management strategies of financial institutions. 122
Institutions that choose to hedge their risks with derivatives will incur
the significant systems costs associated with implementation of the
standard, while those that maintain unhedged positions will not. 123
This provides an incentive for management not to use derivatives as
part of a prudent risk management strategy.124 Furthermore, because
banks are already facing a scarcity of resources to devote to resolving
year 2000 systems issues, management may decide to avoid the
systems complications associated with implementation of SFAS 133 by
not utilizing derivatives to manage risk. 125 Finally, smaller institutions
may find the cost of these systems issues prohibitive, and thus may
choose not to use derivatives as hedging instruments. 126
A final drawback to the implementation of SFAS 133 is that
financial institutions may be forced to alter certain consumer products
because of their inability to qualify for hedge accounting if derivatives
117. See Certain Derivatives to Lose Luster, supra note 115.
118. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 402 (prepared statement of William J.
Roberts).
119. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
120. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
121. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
122. See id. at 400 (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
123. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
124. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
125. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
126. See id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
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are used to hedge the risks associated with these products. 127 There
are two main examples of such products. First, mortgage bankers no
longer may offer consumers the option of locking in a fixed interest
rate any time after the loan application is accepted but before the loan
is closed. 128 This option is beneficial to consumers as they can benefit
from the fixed rate-lock if rates increase; however, it exposes the
institution to interest rate risk. 129 In order to hedge this exposure,
mortgage bankers currently use forwards. 30 However, this option
may be eliminated as the accounting for these derivatives under SFAS
133 increases the volatility of the institution's equity. 131 A second
result may be the reintroduction of prepayment penalties. 132 By
offering borrowers the ability to prepay loans without penalty, lenders
are exposing themselves to the risk of falling interest rates.
133
Currently, most mortgage bankers hedge this exposure with
derivatives. 13  However, if they determine that the use of these
derivatives will result in significant volatility in the financial
statements under SFAS 133, they may cease to use derivatives and
instead reintroduce prepayment penalties to manage this risk.
35
V. RESPONSES TO THE BANKING INDUSTRY'S CONCERNS
Although the banking industry has raised some valid concerns
regarding the impact SFAS 133 will have on its members, a careful
examination of the statement will demonstrate that, despite these
concerns, the new standard will significantly improve the accounting
for derivatives. Specifically, the new standard appropriately
recognizes the fair value of derivatives on the balance sheet, represents
a fair compromise with respect to the accounting for subsequent
changes in the fair values of these financial instruments, and will not
127. See FASB Hearing, supra note 81, at 315 (prepared statement of John T.
Thornton).
128. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
129. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
130. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
131. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
132. See id. at 316 (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
133. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
134. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
135. See id. (prepared statement of John T. Thornton).
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necessarily lead to investor uncertainty over volatility or the decline of
prudent risk management strategies.
The most fundamental concept of SFAS 133 is that derivatives
should be recorded on the balance sheet at fair value. 136 All of the
other complexities of the standard, which generally relate to the
accounting for subsequent changes in fair value of these instruments,
necessarily flow from this basic concept. The current accounting for
derivatives does not require many derivatives to be recorded on the
balance sheet. 137  This practice is neither an oversight of the
accounting profession, nor the result of a previous decision that
derivatives should not be recorded on the balance sheet. 138 Rather, it
is the result of the basic accounting model that requires assets and
liabilities to be recorded at historical cost. 13  Under this basic model,
derivatives are not recorded on the balance sheet because they often
involve no up front cash payment, and not because they have
inconsequential economic effects. '40 The current practice is simply an
improper accounting method because derivatives represent either a
contractual obligation to make a net payment or payments in the
future, which is clearly a liability, or they represent the contractual
right to receive a net payment or payments in the future, which is
clearly an asset. 141 Since derivatives often have little or no historical
cost, the true economic effects of these instruments are not reflected in
the financial statements under the historical cost method of
accounting. 142 Thus, the only way to record these assets or liabilities
is to use the fair value of the instrument.
The alternative to fair value, namely the continued use of
historical cost with simple disclosure of fair value, is problematic.
136. See id. at 293 (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
137. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
138. See id. at 294 (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
139. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
140. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth). This conclusion follows
directly from the definition of a derivative contained in SFAS 133, which lists the attribute
that derivatives require "no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is
smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have
a similar response to changes in market factors" as one of the three principle
characteristics of a derivative financial instrument.
141. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 360 (prepared testimony of Edmund L.
Jenkins).
142. See FASB Hearing, supra note 81, at 294 (prepared statement of Professor Mary
E. Barth).
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According to the FASB's Concepts Standards, disclosure is not an
adequate substitute for recognition of an asset or liability143 because
disclosures about derivatives are located in the notes to the financial
statements, where information is harder to find and understand and
may seem less important.'44 The lack of recognition of derivatives on
the balance sheet has led to unpredictable losses. For example, in
1994 Proctor and Gamble surprised its investors with the
announcement that it had lost tens of millions of dollars on
unrecognized derivative financial instruments. 141 In that same year,
the Treasurer of Orange County, California announced the county had
lost $1.7 billion on its unrecognized derivatives. 146 Under SFAS 133,
these instruments would have been recognized on the balance sheet,
thereby giving investors the information necessary to assess the
possibility of such losses.
Given that recording derivatives at fair value on the balance
sheet is the appropriate way to account for these instruments, the
methodology adopted by SFAS 133 for recording subsequent changes
in the fair values of these instruments is a fair compromise between
the FASB and the banking industry. 147  There are two simple
alternatives to SFAS 133 accounting for these changes. The first is to
recognize decreases in the fair value of derivatives (losses) as assets
and increases (gains) as liabilities.1 41 Since losses do not provide a
firm with any present or future benefit and gains do represent present
or future obligations, this alternative is clearly improper. '4' The
second alternative is to record all gains or losses on derivatives in
earnings in the period of change. While this method is proper from an
accounting standpoint, the banking industry vehemently opposes this
simple requirement because they fear it would significantly increase
143. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
144. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 360 (prepared testimony of Edmund L.
Jenkins).
145. See Glenn Cheney, FASB Rules on Derivatives, Challenges Critics, Congress,
AccT. TODAY, June 22, 1998, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, CURNWS File.
146. See Sam Loewenberg, Called on to Account on Derivatives, LEGAL TIMES, May
4, 1998, at 4.
147. See generally FASB Hearing, supra note 81 (prepared statement of Professor
Mary E. Barth).
148. See id. at 296 (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
149. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 361 (prepared testimony of Edmund L.
Jenkins).
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the volatility of the income statement and does not properly reflect the
hedging strategies of financial institutions. 150
By adopting the aforementioned standards relating to hedge
accounting, SFAS 133 represents a compromise that significantly
reduces the volatility problem in two ways. First, gains or losses on
derivatives classified as fair value hedges may be offset in earnings by
gains or losses recorded in the current period on the items being
hedged.' 5' This solution results from SFAS 133's allowance of the
historical cost of hedged items to be adjusted for changes in the fair
value of the item due to the risk being hedged.' 52  Thus, the only
income volatility that will result from transactions accounted for this
way will be due to the ineffectiveness of the hedge. 5 3 Management
will thus be more accountable for its hedging strategies and will insure
proper recording of that portion of derivatives that represents
speculation as opposed to risk management. 1
54
The second way SFAS 133 addresses the concerns relating to
volatility in earnings is by allowing gains or losses from derivatives
used in certain hedging strategies to be recorded in equity in the period
of change and then later reclassed to earnings in the period when the
gains or losses on the items being hedged are recorded in earnings. 1
5
For example, the use of forwards to hedge the mortgage-banking
pipeline will undoubtedly increase equity volatility. However, this is a
result of the unique accounting problems posed by hedging anticipated
transactions.15 6  Since the hedged transaction (i.e., the closing and
subsequent sale of the loan) is only expected to occur, it is not
appropriate to record its economic effects in the financial
statements. 1 7  Therefore, the gains or losses from this expected
transaction are not available to offset the gains or losses from the
derivative. This volatility is an appropriate accounting result,
150. See generally id. (prepared statement of William J. Roberts).
151. See FASB Hearing, supra note 81, at 295 (prepared statement of Professor Mary
E. Barth).
152. See generally id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
153. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
154. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
155. See id. (prepared statement of Professor Mary E. Barth).
156. See Derivatives Hearings, supra note 4, at 361 (prepared testimony of Edmund L.
Jenkins).
157. See id. (prepared testimony of Edmund L. Jenkins).
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however, because financial statements reflect a firm's existing assets
and liabilities at a given point in time and do not include the results of
expected transactions that may or may not actually occur. 158
Finally, evidence suggests that the concerns over volatility and
the reduction of risk management are unwarranted. John Brennan,
President of the Vanguard Group, indicated in his testimony before
Congress that "the standard will not create volatility in the earnings of
derivatives users." 15 9 According to Brennan, the volatility is already
there, and it is just difficult for investors to quantify the impact of
derivatives under current accounting methods. 160  Thus, if financial
institutions do not recognize the fair value of their derivatives on their
balance sheets, they may face a higher cost of capital as investors will
be less willing to accept the risk associated with their debt or equity
securities. 16 1  Furthermore, although the standard may reduce
speculation, it will not discourage companies from using derivatives to
manage risk as it is economics, not accounting, that dictates the use of
derivatives. 162 This testimony is significant because it is the product of
experience rather than mere speculation as investment companies are
already planning to market all derivatives positions held by their
mutual funds according to special accounting rules that apply to these
institutions. 161
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO SFAS 133
In response to the heavy criticism of SFAS 133, especially the
objections of financial institutions to the new Standard, two bills were
introduced in Congress which sought to limit the impact of SFAS 133.
The first bill, S. 1560,16' stated that any accounting standards issued
by the FASB after November 13, 1997 that related to accounting for
derivatives should not be regarded as generally accepted accounting
158. See id. (prepared testimony of Edmund L. Jenkins).
159. FASB Hearing, supra note 81, at 326 (prepared statement of John J. Brennan).
160. See id. (prepared statement of John J. Brennan).
161. See id. at 327 (prepared statement of John J. Brennan).
162. See id. (prepared statement of John J. Brennan).
163. See id. at 328 (prepared statement of John J. Brennan).
164. S. 1560 was sponsored by Senator Lauch Faircloth from North Carolina and was
introduced on November 13, 1997. See S. 1560, 105th Cong. (1997), available in
LEXIS, Genfed Library, BLTEXT File;
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/sudocs/aces/aaces002. html>.
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principles for depository institutions for purposes of complying with
federal banking law.' 65 However, this legislation is no longer a threat
to the full implementation of SFAS 133 as the bill's sponsor failed in
his bid for re-election in the November 1998 elections.
Section 3 of the second bill, H.R. 3165,166 amends section 19
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in several ways.' 67 First, it
requires the SEC to formally approve all accounting principles
proposed by the FASB. 6 s The process for approval begins with the
FASB filing with the SEC any proposed accounting principles.169 The
SEC then must give interested persons a reasonable opportunity to
submit opinions on the proposed standard. 170 Finally, the Commission
must either approve the proposed standard or institute proceedings
within 35 days of the publication of notice of the filing of the proposal
in order to determine if the proposed standard should be rejected. '7'
H.R. 3165 also sets forth the grounds on which the SEC should
approve a proposed standard. 172 Specifically, the Commission should
approve a proposed accounting principle if it is "consistent with the
public interest and the protection of investors." 173 Furthermore, it
should consider "whether the principle will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation." ' H.R. 3165 also provides that
the SEC should consult with all federal banking agencies that regulate
an entity that will be affected by a proposed standard when
determining whether to approve or reject the proposal. 175  Finally,
H.R. 3165 makes judicial review of accounting standards available by
stating that a proposed standard that is approved by the SEC is to be
165. See id.
166. H.R. 3165 was introduced on February 5, 1998 by Representative Richard Baker
from Louisiana. See H.R. 3165, 105th Cong. (1998), available in LEXIS, Genfed





171. See id. The 35 day time limit may be extended to up to 90 days after the notice is
published if the SEC finds a longer period appropriate and publishes its reasons for







considered a rule of the Commission. 176
As might be expected, H.R. 3165 and S. 1560 sparked heavy
debate over the future of SFAS 133 and, more generally, the role of
the FASB. Proponents of the two bills focused their support on two
main areas. First, under H.R. 3165, companies will be able to seek
judicial review of the process whereby proposed accounting standards
are adopted. 177 This would eliminate the need for aggrieved persons to
seek legislative help from Congress every time they disagree with the
substance of proposed accounting standards. 171 Furthermore,
Representative Baker has argued that the power to seek judicial review
will not result in a litigation explosion as "few regulated parties will
want to take their regulator to court unless they harbor serious
concerns." 1
79
The second main argument in support of the proposed
legislation is that it will increase the accountability of the private
sector bodies that propose new accounting standards, specifically the
FASB, without necessarily increasing the SEC's authority. 8 '
Currently, the SEC regards the standards set by the FASB as generally
accepted accounting principles for financial reporting purposes.''
Thus the SEC has implicitly approved the FASB's standards. Under
H.R. 3165, the role of the FASB in proposing new standards would be
preserved.8 2 The only change would be that the SEC would have to
explicitly approve the new standard after considering whether it is in
the public interest.8 3 Bill Leiter, chief accounting expert at Bane One
Corp., has argued that the SEC should have to formally approve
accounting standards proposed by the FASB because the FASB went
through its formal process for adopting SFAS 133 but did not really
react to any of the comments made by those who disagree with the
new standard.8 4  By requiring SEC approval, Leiter believes the
176. See id.
177. See Paul Salfi, An Unlikely Impediment to Doing Banking Business, ABA
BANKING J., Aug. 1998, at 55, 55.
178. See generally Bill Subjects FASB to Judicial Process, CFO ALERT, Feb. 9, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, CURNWS File.
179. Id.
180. See Salfi, supra note 177, at 55.
181. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 79.
182. See Salfi, supra note 177, at 55.
183. See id.
184. See Bill Subjects FASB to Judicial Process, supra note 178.
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FASB would pay more attention to comments in the future.' 85 The
requirement of explicit SEC approval would also make the review
process for accounting standards similar to other self-regulatory
institutions like the National Association of Securities Dealers, thereby
creating similar rights to judicial review. 186
Although there has been some support for passing legislation
that alters the impact of SFAS 133, critics of the proposed legislation
have pointed out serious flaws that call into question the wisdom of
adopting H.R. 3165 or proposing future legislation in this area. First,
Edmund Jenkins, Chairman of the FASB, noted that companies
already have the right to challenge proposed accounting standards in
court, thereby making H.R. 3165 moot.' 87 Currently, if a firm feels
that the FASB has been "arbitrary and capricious" in its process of
adopting an accounting standard, it can request the chief accountant of
the SEC to exempt it from the standard. 88 If this request is denied,
then the firm can appeal to the commissioners.' 89  If the
commissioners also decline, then the firm can seek help from the
judicial process. ' 90 By expanding the scope of judicial review beyond
this standard, H.R. 3165 could be placing a huge financial burden on
the FASB in the form of legal costs incurred while defending its
accounting standards., 9'
The second general criticism of the proposed legislation is that
the FASB's current process for adopting accounting standards provides
firms adequate due process. The current process affords interested
parties the opportunity to comment on proposed standards in writing as
well as attend open meetings to voice any potential concerns.' 92 In
fact, before SFAS 133 was formally adopted, the FASB held 140
public meetings over a span of six years.' 9 3 The composition of the
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Edmund Jenkins, Beware Trap of Politicizing Financial Reporting Rules, AM.
BANKER, May 21, 1998, at 4.
188. See J. Edward Ketz & Paul B.W. Miller, Financial Accounting Fairness Act:





192. See Jenkins, supra note 187, at 4.
193. See Loewenberg, supra note 146, at 4.
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FASB also helps ensure that proposed accounting standards reflect the
opinions of professionals in a wide variety of fields. Only three of the
seven Board members are from accounting fims, with only two of
those members coming from large firms.' 94 The rest of the Board is
comprised of members from the investing and financial statement-
preparing communities as well as the academic world. 195 The FASB
also seeks input from a wide range of interested parties before
proposing new standards. 
196
The third general criticism centers on the negative effects of
politicizing the process of setting accounting standards. First,
allowing a governmental body to approve accounting standards may
lead to a general lowering of standards as political pressure from
interested parties, namely those being forced to comply with the
standards, will influence the process. 97 The consequences of lower
accounting standards include higher capital costs, as investors will be
faced with uncertainty over untrustworthy financial statements.
198
There is already evidence that political pressure may have influenced
the introduction of H.R. 3165 as Representative Baker, the bill's
sponsor, received money from 18 banking political action committees
in 1997.'9' Empirical evidence suggests that allowing a governmental
agency to set accounting standards can lead to disastrous results.
During the 1980's, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
allowed S&L's to ignore generally accepted accounting principles, as
adopted by the FASB, and defer the losses realized on the sale of loans
over a twenty-year period.200  This allowance meant that a deferred
loss was recorded on the balance sheet as an asset of the institution.20 '
The result was approximately $150 billion in losses from S&L's that
194. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 82.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 83. These parties include: the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants standards committee, similar committees from the individual states' CPA
associations, the standards committee at the American Accounting Association, financial
analysts, the various self-regulating organizations of the securities business (such as the
NASD), accounting firms, corporations, and the various banking regulators. See id.
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the FHLBB had certified were solvent. 22 Other concerns with
allowing a governmental agency to certify accounting standards
include possible jurisdictional disputes among regulators and the need
for new competencies within various governmental agencies.2 3
The final, and perhaps most compelling, criticism of the
proposed legislation is that it threatens the current effort to introduce
international accounting standards. The need for a set of generally
recognized international accounting standards is clear, as the lack of
such standards seriously limits the formation of world capital
markets.2" Many companies operate in an international marketplace,
and as such may require access to capital from world markets, as they
no longer have the ability to raise sufficient capital domestically to
facilitate their desired growth rate.2"' Furthermore, firms may want to
widen their shareholder base by listing their shares on international
exchanges, thereby emphasizing their commitment to countries in
which they operate as well as making it easier to use stock rather than
cash to finance acquisitions abroad.20 6
Without the ability to report their accounts in one set of
generally recognized accounting standards, companies that desire
access to world capital markets may find the costs of conversion to
various other standards prohibitive. For example, the SEC currently
does not recognize any accounting standards other than U.S. GAAP
for cross-border filings in the U.S.20 7 Thus, foreign companies that
wish to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) must
comply with U.S. GAAP.2"8 The conversion from other standards to
GAAP may result in huge disparities in the financial position of
foreign companies. For example, when Daimler-Benz was listed on
the NYSE in October 1993, its first half profits of DM 168 million
under German standards became a loss of DM 949 million when its
202. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 79.
203. See Boston Analysts Dismayed Over Possible Derivatives Legislation, PR
NEWSWIRE, January 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, CURNWS File.
204. See generally Stewart Hamilton, Accountants Gather Round Different Standards,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at 12.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Salfi, supra note 177, at 55.
208. See Hamilton, supra note 204, at 12.
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accounts were converted to GAAP. 20 9 A similar disparity occurred
when the German conglomerate Hoechst was listed in 1994 as its
profits of DM 1.7 billion under German standards became a loss of
DM 57 million when the accounts were brought in compliance with
GAAP.21° Thus, in order to have access to the NYSE, both companies
incurred not only the cost of converting their accounts, such as
systems changes and fees paid to auditors, but also a presumably
higher cost of capital as investors were faced with uncertainty caused
by the disparities in financial position of the two companies as
reported under the different accounting standards."2 '
An international effort is currently underway to adopt one set
of accounting standards, and H.R. 3165 seriously threatens this effort.
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) is
currently working on a set of standards to be presented to the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSC). 212 The
IASC is made up of the accountants' societies of 86 countries 213 and
generally has the support of the European Union, as evidenced by
recent legislation in Germany that allows companies to use standards
set by the IASC for domestic reporting purposes. 214  Generally
speaking, the IASC has adopted the main principles of SFAS 133,
therefore making it entirely possible that the FASB's standards for
accounting for derivatives could become the de facto standard for the
world.215 If H.R. 3165 is passed, the result could well be two sets of
standards in the U.S. alone: the FASB's rules for private companies
216and the SEC's standards for public companies. The resulting
disparities in accounting standards in the U.S. would obviously
threaten the IASC's effort since its standards would not be generally
accepted in the U.S. and therefore would not guarantee foreign
companies access to U.S. capital markets.217
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See generally id.
212. See Cheney, supra note 145.
213. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 89.
214. See Hamilton, supra note 204, at 12.
215. See Cheney, supra note 145.
216. See Wanda A. Wallace, Assurance Forum: Stop Playing Politics With Accounting
Rules, AccT. TODAY, May 25, 1998, available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, CURNWS
File.
217. See generally id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The general purpose of this note was to analyze both the
impact that SFAS 133 will have on financial institutions and the
legislation proposed as a result of the FASB issuing this standard. The
first conclusion of this analysis is that any negative impact SFAS 133
will have on financial institutions is significantly outweighed by the
benefits of improved accounting for derivative transactions.2"8 The
second is that the pending legislative response that attempts to limit the
applicability of this standard and to change the current process for
adopting accounting standards is inappropriate because of its failure to
address the banking industry's specific criticisms of SFAS 133 and its




218. See supra notes 47-163 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 164-217 and accompanying text.
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